For years, the shadow of terrorism in Nigeria has been associated largely with the North-East.
But the alleged emergence of a senior Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) commander deep inside Ondo State tells a more unsettling story — one that security agencies believe could have had serious consequences for parts of southern Nigeria.
A joint operation involving the Nigerian Army, the Department of State Services (DSS) and the Western Nigeria Security Network, popularly known as Amotekun, has reportedly killed a suspected senior ISWAP commander identified as Abdussamad Ohida, also known as Anwar.
Ohida was reportedly killed alongside other suspected members of the terrorist group during an intelligence-led operation in a forest in Owo, Ondo State, at the weekend.
According to security sources cited by Zagazola Makama, the operation was launched after intelligence indicated that Ohida was allegedly preparing attacks in parts of southern Nigeria.
The man security agencies were hunting
Ohida was reportedly not a new name within the intelligence community.
Sources said he previously served as deputy to the ISWAP Central Nigeria leader, Abu Ikrimah, also known as Abu Uwais, before Ikrimah was arrested by the DSS in 2023.
Following the arrest, Ohida allegedly assumed a leadership role within ISWAP networks operating across parts of North-Central and southern Nigeria.
His alleged responsibilities, according to the sources, went beyond membership of the terrorist organisation.
He was reportedly involved in the planning, coordination and execution of attacks.
That alleged rise in the organisation’s hierarchy became particularly significant after intelligence gathered from the interrogation of Abu Uwais reportedly gave security agencies information about Ohida’s activities.
A Christmas-period attack plan
One of the most disturbing claims surrounding the operation is that Ohida was allegedly preparing attacks targeting civilians during the forthcoming Yuletide period.
A security source said intelligence suggested the plan was not limited to isolated attacks but was intended to create wider disruption and potentially interfere with preparations for Nigeria’s 2027 general elections.
The intelligence was reportedly corroborated by international partners, including counterparts in the United Kingdom.
The source said the information eventually contributed to the operation that resulted in Ohida’s death.
If the intelligence claims are accurate, the operation may have prevented an attempt to establish or strengthen a terrorist foothold in parts of southern Nigeria.
From Owo to Kuje: the attacks linked to Ohida
Security sources also attributed a string of previous attacks to the suspected commander.
Among them was the December 31, 2025 attack on the Ipele Divisional Police Station in Owo, Ondo State, during which attackers reportedly carted away eight AK-47 rifles before using explosives to bring down the station.
Ohida was also allegedly linked to the July 28, 2022 attack on a military checkpoint along the Suleja–Zuba Road in Niger State, an incident reportedly resulting in the deaths of soldiers, officers and civilians.
Another major incident allegedly attributed to him was the July 11, 2022 attack on the Kuje Correctional Centre in Abuja.
The attack on the correctional facility was particularly significant because it resulted in the escape of numerous inmates, including suspected terrorists.
The sources further linked Ohida to attacks on police facilities in Kogi State.
These included the April 23, 2022 attack on Ogaminana Police Station in Adavi Local Government Area, where five police officers were reportedly killed, as well as the February 7, 2022 attack on the Okene Area Command police station.
The list reportedly stretches further back to December 24, 2020, when a naval checkpoint in Okene, Kogi State, was attacked, leaving two naval officers dead.
The arrest that reportedly changed everything
The arrest of Abu Uwais in 2023 appears to have been an important turning point in the intelligence trail.
According to the security sources, information obtained during his interrogation helped investigators understand the activities and alleged plans of his former deputy.
Ohida subsequently emerged as a suspected key figure within ISWAP’s activities beyond its traditional stronghold.
That development would have raised a serious concern for security agencies.
For an organisation historically associated with Nigeria’s North-East insurgency, the ability to organise operations in the North-Central and southern parts of the country could represent a potentially dangerous expansion of its operational network.
Why Ondo matters
The location of the reported operation is significant.
Owo sits in Ondo State, a gateway between parts of south-western Nigeria and the country’s central belt.
The reported presence of a senior ISWAP figure in a forest there therefore raises uncomfortable questions about how far terrorist networks may be attempting to spread, recruit, organise or establish operational cells outside areas traditionally associated with insurgency.
It also highlights the growing importance of intelligence sharing between conventional military formations, domestic intelligence agencies and regional security networks.
In this case, the operation reportedly brought together the Army, DSS and Amotekun.
A major blow or the beginning of another phase?
Security sources described Ohida’s elimination as a significant disruption to ISWAP’s leadership structure and operational network.
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They also compared the development with the killing of ISIS leader Abu Bilal al-Minuki months earlier, arguing that the loss of senior figures could complicate the group’s efforts to expand its presence in Nigeria.
But the bigger question remains: does the death of one commander dismantle the network, or merely force it to change shape?
Terrorist organisations have repeatedly demonstrated an ability to replace commanders, reorganise cells and exploit gaps in security.
That means the reported killing of Ohida may be an important intelligence and operational success, but it does not automatically eliminate the wider threat.
Instead, it places another question on the table for Nigeria’s security establishment: how deeply have terrorist networks already penetrated areas outside their traditional theatres of operation?
The answer could determine whether the Ondo operation becomes remembered as the disruption of a planned expansion — or as a warning of how the next phase of Nigeria’s terrorism challenge may look.