For years, Nigeria’s battle against terrorism has been marked by deadly attacks, mass abductions, displaced communities and military operations aimed at weakening armed groups. Yet one of the most difficult questions has remained: how do you persuade fighters who once took up arms to abandon the battlefield for good?
A new claim by the United States military suggests that the balance may be shifting, at least in one important area.
The Commander of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), General Dagvin Anderson, has said the number of Islamic State fighters surrendering in Nigeria has increased by more than 200 per cent since a joint Nigerian-US operation in May.
Anderson attributed the reported increase to the operation, which targeted a senior Islamic State commander, as well as subsequent military offensives against the terrorist network.
The development could represent a significant gain for Nigeria’s counterterrorism campaign. But it also raises questions about the scale of the insurgency, the factors driving fighters to surrender and whether military pressure can deliver lasting security to communities that have endured years of violence.
The Lagos Exhibition
Anderson made the disclosure on Monday on the sidelines of the Africa International Defence Exhibition in Lagos.
He said the cooperation between Nigerian and American security agencies had been central to the operation’s success, highlighting the importance of combining local intelligence with the United States’ understanding of international terrorist networks.
“The partnership with the Nigerian Armed Forces and Nigerian intelligence was exceptional, and that’s what really enabled that partnership to happen and to take out the number two terrorist in the world for ISIS,” he said.
The AFRICOM commander did not, in the reported remarks, provide the absolute number of fighters who had surrendered or a detailed breakdown of the figures behind the increase.
Consequently, while the reported rise is significant, it does not by itself establish how much the overall strength of Islamic State-linked groups in Nigeria has declined.
The May Operation And The Growing Pressure On ISIS
The reported increase in surrenders places fresh attention on the impact of the May operation and the military offensives that followed.
According to Anderson, the operation targeted a senior Islamic State figure, with Nigerian and American agencies working together to identify and act against the terrorist network.
He said the partnership brought together two capabilities that complement each other: Nigeria’s understanding of local conditions and the United States’ intelligence on the wider international network.
“Some of it is intelligence, but also understanding of the terrorist network globally. And so Nigeria brings the regional and local understanding, while we bring the global network understanding, and together that becomes very powerful,” he added.
The approach reflects a wider reality in counterterrorism operations. Armed groups may operate within particular communities and geographical areas, but their networks, leadership structures, financing and relationships can extend beyond national borders.
Local intelligence can help security forces understand the terrain, identify suspicious movements and establish relationships within affected communities. International intelligence can help investigators trace connections, identify senior figures and understand how local groups relate to wider extremist networks.
When these capabilities are effectively combined, security agencies may be better positioned to disrupt operations and put pressure on armed groups.
However, the reported rise in surrenders should not automatically be interpreted as proof that Islamic State-linked groups have been defeated or that the threat has disappeared.
A terrorist organisation can lose senior figures and experience defections while retaining the ability to recruit new members, reorganise and carry out attacks.
The real test will be whether the reported gains are sustained and whether they translate into fewer attacks, safer communities and a lasting reduction in the group’s ability to operate.
Why Would Fighters Surrender?
A reported increase of more than 200 per cent naturally raises another question: what is making more fighters abandon the insurgency?
Anderson linked the development to the May operation and subsequent military offensives. Sustained pressure on an armed group can weaken its leadership, disrupt its operations and make continued participation more dangerous for its members.
But surrender decisions can also be influenced by other factors, including internal divisions, loss of access to supplies, declining confidence in leadership, fear of prosecution and the availability of a credible route out of the conflict.
The reported figures alone do not establish which of these factors is most responsible for the increase in Nigeria.
Nor should surrender be confused with the complete collapse of an insurgent organisation. Some fighters may abandon the struggle because they believe their prospects have deteriorated, while others may leave for personal reasons or in response to changing conditions within their group.
What matters is whether those who surrender remain out of the conflict and whether their departure weakens the organisation’s ability to recruit, plan attacks and sustain its operations.
For communities that have suffered from years of violence, the value of any increase in surrenders will ultimately depend on whether it produces a measurable improvement in their security.
The Controversial Question: Can Military Force Defeat Terrorism Alone?
Anderson himself acknowledged that military assistance, although important, cannot resolve all of Nigeria’s security problems.
He pointed to the continuing challenges of terrorism and kidnapping, stressing the need for investment in good governance and development.
His remarks touch on one of the most difficult debates surrounding Nigeria’s security crisis: whether military operations can deliver lasting peace without addressing the conditions that allow armed groups to recruit and operate.
Security operations can disrupt terrorist networks, remove commanders and weaken their ability to attack. But lasting stability also depends on whether communities can access justice, education, employment, public services and trustworthy institutions.
Where people have little confidence in public institutions, where communities feel abandoned or where young people see few legitimate economic opportunities, armed groups may find conditions in which recruitment becomes easier.
That does not mean poverty automatically produces terrorism, or that economic hardship excuses participation in violence. Most people living in difficult circumstances do not become insurgents.
Rather, the point is that security and development cannot be treated as unrelated responsibilities.
Military pressure may create an opportunity to restore stability, but civilian institutions must help ensure that the gains are not temporary.
For Nigeria, the challenge is to turn operational successes into lasting improvements in the lives of people who have spent years living with insecurity.
The Difficult Business Of Rehabilitating Repentant Insurgents
Anderson also commended Nigeria’s programme for rehabilitating and reintegrating former insurgents into society.
The programme reflects a difficult reality: ending an insurgency requires not only confronting those who continue to fight but also deciding what should happen to people who surrender and seek to leave armed groups.
Reintegration can help reduce the likelihood of former fighters returning to violence, particularly when it involves credible screening, counselling, education, vocational training and support for lawful livelihoods.
But the process is sensitive.
For communities that have experienced killings, abductions, destroyed homes and years of displacement, the return of former insurgents can provoke anger, fear and suspicion.
Survivors may question why people associated with armed groups should receive rehabilitation or assistance when victims themselves continue to struggle to rebuild their lives.
That concern cannot simply be dismissed. A reintegration programme that ignores victims’ needs or fails to explain how former fighters are assessed can undermine public trust.
At the same time, treating every person who surrenders as beyond rehabilitation may close off opportunities to weaken armed groups and prevent further violence.
Accountability
The essential issue is accountability.
Rehabilitation should not automatically mean immunity from prosecution. People suspected of serious crimes must be handled in accordance with the law, while those eligible for reintegration should be assessed through credible processes.
Communities also need support, including assistance for victims, reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, psychosocial services and opportunities to rebuild their livelihoods.
Without such measures, reintegration risks becoming a programme focused on former fighters while the needs of the people who suffered remain unresolved.
Anderson underscored the importance of addressing the challenges facing young people, arguing that their energy should be channelled towards productive activities.
“How do you take the growing youth population and channel that energy for a positive effort? And to me, that’s what we all need to work on, but it has to be done locally,” he said.
His argument places responsibility not only on security agencies but also on governments and communities to create opportunities that help young people build lives outside armed groups.
The Security Threat Extends Beyond ISIS
The AFRICOM commander also identified terrorism financing, piracy, smuggling, drug trafficking and illegal fishing as major security threats in the region.
These activities can undermine public safety, weaken state authority and create opportunities for criminal networks to operate across borders.
Their interconnected nature makes regional cooperation particularly important. Information shared between countries can help authorities identify networks, track illicit activities and coordinate responses to threats that do not stop at national boundaries.
Anderson also addressed the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), saying the United States was looking to resume dialogue with the three countries to improve security cooperation.
The three countries’ departure from ECOWAS has complicated regional relations at a time when cooperation against terrorism and cross-border criminal activity remains important.
Restoring dialogue could help create opportunities for security agencies to work together, although the extent of any future cooperation will depend on political relations and the arrangements reached by the countries involved.
Did You Miss? 31,400 Heat Deaths Projected: What Nigerians Need To Know About El Niño
For Nigeria, which faces security threats across several regions, effective cooperation with neighbouring states remains an important part of efforts to prevent armed groups and criminal networks from exploiting borders.
What Would A Genuine Turning Point Look Like?
The reported 200 per cent increase in surrenders offers a potentially encouraging signal, but the percentage alone cannot answer the bigger questions about Nigeria’s security situation.
To assess the significance of the development, Nigerians would need clearer information about the number of fighters involved, the period covered by the comparison, the groups they belonged to and whether the increase has continued beyond the initial operation.
It would also be important to establish whether attacks and civilian casualties have declined over a sustained period, whether communities have regained access to their farms and markets, and whether displaced residents can return home safely.
These are the outcomes that would help demonstrate whether military pressure is producing lasting change.
The United States-Nigeria partnership may improve intelligence sharing and operational capabilities, but the long-term responsibility for protecting Nigerian communities rests with the country’s own institutions.
That means sustaining security operations while improving governance, supporting affected communities, strengthening the justice system and ensuring that rehabilitation programmes are credible and accountable.
The reported increase in surrenders could become an important part of that effort. But it should be treated as one indicator of progress rather than the final measure of success.
For Nigerians who have lived with the consequences of terrorism, the ultimate victory will not be defined by the number of fighters who surrender or commanders who are removed.
It will be defined by whether families can sleep without fear, farmers can return to their fields, children can attend school safely and communities can rebuild their lives without the constant threat of violence.
Until those changes become a lasting reality, the reported gains will remain encouraging—but the fight for peace will continue.