Islamic cleric Sheikh Ahmad Gumi has made a startling claim about one of Nigeria’s most enduring security crises, alleging that former President Olusegun Obasanjo once met Boko Haram leaders in Maiduguri and secured their willingness to surrender their weapons.

According to Gumi, the opportunity to potentially end the insurgency through dialogue was ultimately lost because the government allegedly failed to act on commitments arising from the discussions.
The Kaduna-based cleric made the claim in a video while renewing his controversial call for the Federal Government to consider dialogue and negotiation as part of its strategy for dealing with armed groups.
Gumi argued that talking to insurgents should not automatically be treated as surrendering to terrorism, insisting that negotiations have been used in different conflicts around the world.
Obasanjo told me about the meeting
Gumi said the former president personally told him about an attempt to open a line of communication with Boko Haram during the early years of the insurgency.
According to the cleric, Obasanjo travelled to Maiduguri and met with representatives of the group, who allegedly agreed to lay down their arms.
“Look at Obasanjo; he told me this himself that, at the early stage of Boko Haram, he went to Maiduguri where he met with the leaders of Boko Haram and they agreed to lay down their arms,” Gumi said.
“And he came back, but the government was reluctant to take action, and he was bitter about that; you can interview him.”
The allegation, if independently established, would raise fresh questions about how Nigeria handled opportunities for dialogue during the early stages of the Boko Haram insurgency.
Gumi, however, presented the episode as an example of what he believes could have been achieved through negotiation.
‘Why can’t we negotiate with them?’
For Gumi, the central issue is whether dialogue with armed groups should remain off the table simply because the groups are designated as terrorists or have committed violent acts.
He pointed to international conflicts in which governments have engaged armed organisations in negotiations, arguing that Nigeria should not treat dialogue as an unacceptable option.
“You negotiate with the Taliban, Hamas; you negotiate with everybody you have problems with; why can’t we negotiate with them? So it’s now like a taboo to negotiate with them?” he asked.
His position is likely to reignite an old and deeply divisive argument in Nigeria: can a conflict that has survived years of military operations be ended through the same approach that failed to produce a decisive victory?
For supporters of dialogue, negotiation could create an avenue for surrender and reintegration.
For critics, however, negotiating with violent groups risks rewarding insurgency and could undermine the authority of the state.
Gumi wants Nigeria to write its own security playbook
The cleric also urged the Federal Government to develop a strategy based primarily on Nigeria’s circumstances rather than allowing international expectations to dictate its response to the country’s security challenges.
“Nigeria has to show the international community that this is our baby, this is how we want, and not depending on your ethics and standards,” he said.
“The government should not listen to the international community because this is our problem and we have to solve it.
“The government shouldn’t be blackmailed; that’s what is hindering the government.”
Gumi’s argument is that Nigeria should be free to pursue whatever strategy it believes can bring an end to the violence, even where that strategy differs from the expectations of foreign governments and international organisations.
‘I would give them six months’
Gumi went further by outlining what he would do if he were in charge of the country.
He proposed a defined period during which insurgents could surrender their weapons in exchange for an opportunity to leave the battlefield.
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“If I were to be president, I would just come around and give a six-month amnesty window for them to put down their weapons,” he said.
The proposal would amount to a major shift from a predominantly military approach to one that combines the threat of force with a formal window for surrender.
But it also raises difficult questions.
Who would qualify for such an amnesty? What would happen to those accused of killing civilians? Could commanders be trusted to genuinely disarm? And how would the government prevent an amnesty programme from becoming an opportunity for armed groups to regroup?
The dialogue question refuses to disappear
Nigeria has spent years fighting Boko Haram and other armed groups, with military operations, intelligence efforts and community-based security initiatives forming the backbone of the response.
Yet the persistence of violence continues to fuel arguments over whether the country needs to rethink its approach.
Gumi’s latest comments put that debate back in the spotlight.
His claim about Obasanjo’s alleged meeting with Boko Haram representatives adds another provocative chapter to the argument — particularly because he says the insurgents were once willing to surrender their weapons.
Whether that opportunity could actually have ended the insurgency remains impossible to establish from Gumi’s account alone.
But his broader question is harder to ignore: After years of bloodshed, military operations and failed attempts to crush insurgency, should Nigeria be willing to talk to its enemies if talking could ultimately bring the guns down?
